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Abstract 
Inductive reasoning is fundamental to human cognition, yet it remains unclear how we 
develop this ability and what might influence our inductive choices. We created novel categories in 
which crucial factors such as domain and category structure were manipulated orthogonally. We 
trained 403 4- to 9-year-old children to categorize well matched natural kind and artifact stimuli with 
either featural or relational category structure, followed by induction tasks. This wide age range 
allowed for the first full exploration of the developmental trajectory of inductive reasoning in both 
domains. We found a gradual transition from perceptual to categorical induction with age. This 
pattern was stable across domains, but interestingly, children showed a category bias one year later 
for relational categories. We hypothesize that the ability to use category information in inductive 
reasoning develops gradually, but is delayed when children need to process and apply more complex 
category structures. 
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Adults can use both perceptual cues and category knowledge when making inductive 
inferences (Bulloch & Opfer, 2009; Gelman & Markman, 1986). For example, if we were to install a 
nest box intended for small birds, we could use perceptual cues to judge that a larger bird would not 
inhabit it. In contrast, our category knowledge would allow us to judge that both would visit a bird 
feeder. The extent to which young children are able to use both perceptual and categorical cues 
when making inductive inferences remains under debate (e.g., Badger & Shapiro, 2012; Gelman, 
2003; Gelman & Markman, 1986; Gentner, 1988; Medin & Ortony, 1989; Opfer & Bulloch, 2007; 
Sloutksy & Fisher, 2004; Sloutksy, Kloos & Fisher, 2007). A range of methodologies and stimuli have 
been used to investigate children’s inductive strategies and these have produced contradictory 
findings. In some studies, young children show an early bias for category induction (e.g., Bulloch & 
Opfer, 2009; Opfer & Bulloch, 2007; see Gelman, 2003, for an overview) or analogical reasoning 
(e.g., Goswami, 2001). It has also been shown that young children see category membership as a 
good basis for generalization (e.g., Hayes, McKinnon & Sweller, 2008). In contrast, in other studies, 
young children appear biased towards perceptual induction (e.g., Sloutsky et al., 2007) or surface 
characteristics (e.g., Gentner, 1988), and gradually transition towards category-based reasoning at a 
later developmental stage (e.g., Badger & Shapiro, 2012; Fisher & Sloutsky, 2005; Gentner, 1988; 
Gentner & Rattermann, 1991; Rattermann & Gentner, 1998). These contradictory findings have led 
to a strong debate as to the validity of the methodologies and stimuli used.  
The triad paradigm is commonly used to investigate children’s induction choices because it 
directly sets perceptual against categorical preferences (e.g., Badger & Shapiro, 2012; Gelman & 
Markman, 1986; Sloutsky et al., 2007). A target item is presented alongside two test items, one of 
which matches the target in category but not overall appearance (the categorical choice); the other 
matches the target in overall appearance but not category (the perceptual choice). The child is asked 
to generalize a hidden property of the target onto one of the two test items, or to generalize one of 
the test items’ hidden properties to the target. A target-to-categorical choice generalization is 
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classified as category induction. A target-to-perceptual choice generalization is classified as 
perceptual induction. Gelman and Markman (1986) used real kind stimuli in their triads: for 
example, a blackbird (target), a flamingo (category), and a bat (perceptual). They found that children 
aged 4-5 years generalized the hidden property between the target and category choice significantly 
more often. They concluded that as long as the children knew the category membership of the 
items, they would successfully apply category induction. In contrast, Sloutsky et al. (2007) used 
artificial biological kinds (Ziblets and Flurps) to gain full control of the information children are using 
to make inductive inferences. They used a relational category structure, in which category 
membership was defined by the relationship between two features (relative number of “fingers” to 
“buttons”: an item was a Ziblet if it had more fingers than buttons). Overall appearance was non-
predictive of category membership. Children aged 4 to 5 were trained to categorize these stimuli 
accurately, but made significantly more perceptual induction inferences. This was interpreted as an 
early perceptual bias, which would develop into a category bias with age. There is an ongoing 
argument as to whether real or novel stimuli provide a stronger test of category induction. Gelman 
and Waxman (2007) claim that Sloutsky’s novel stimuli were not biologically plausible and the 
category rules were arbitrary. Therefore, the children would not have responded to the stimuli in the 
same way as real biological kinds as they would not have believed them to be real. Using novel 
stimuli with a complex (and arbitrary) category structure could underestimate children’s category 
induction capabilities. Whereas using real kind stimuli could cause us to falsely interpret appearance 
or familiarity-based choices as category induction (children may choose the more perceptually 
similar or more familiar item).  Unfortunately, the age range in the Sloutsky et al. study is too narrow 
to know whether the children would have used category induction as they aged, or whether both 
younger and older children would have used perceptual induction as they would not have accepted 
the stimuli as natural kinds. 
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A more rigorous test of children’s category induction capabilities is to examine how these 
preferences change as children develop (as in Badger & Shapiro, 2012). If Sloutsky’s perceptual bias 
was caused by the use of unrealistic stimuli with complex category structure, then a “perceptual 
bias” is unlikely to change with development (older children would continue to accept the 
perceptual choice). In contrast, if this were a genuine perceptual bias that transitions into a category 
bias with experience, then children’s preferences should change with age. The current study 
examines whether children’s category induction choices change as a function of children’s age (4-9 
years old), and the nature of the categories with which children are confronted. Specifically, the 
factors governing category membership (hereafter category structure; e.g., Kittur, Hummel & 
Holyoak, 2004; Saiki & Hummell, 1998; see also Barsalou, 1993), and the ontology of the category 
(hereafter domain, e.g., natural kinds vs. artifacts; Keil, 1989).  
Category Structure 
The structure of a category is critical when making generalizations about an unknown item. 
For example, since knives have a common feature (a blade), the presence of this feature on an 
unknown item suggests that the item is likely to share other properties common to the knife 
category (e.g., has the property of “cutting”). Categories can be deterministic – whereby all items of 
a category share at least one parameter that is exclusive to that category – or probabilistic – 
whereby a percentage of items of a category share at least one parameter but no feature is shared 
by all (e.g., see Kittur et al., 2004). We will focus on two key deterministic structures: featural and 
relational. As discussed by Kittur et al. most category learning experiments use exemplars which can 
be distinguished on the basis of particular features. Although these are usually artificial categories, a 
real world example would be the category of knives, which share a unique feature (featural 
structure; e.g., all knives have a blade). In fact, in the real world, categories are often better 
described by the relationship between features (relational structure; e.g., the relationship between 
legs and seat defines a chair). Within the adult category learning literature, the effects of featural 
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versus relational structures have been investigated systematically (e.g., Tomlinson & Love, 2010). 
However, until now no study has investigated the influence of these types of structure (featural vs. 
relational) on the development of induction. This is surprising considering that the natural default 
for young children’s induction may be partly explained by the structure of the stimuli seen. This 
could explain the conflicting findings described above; for example, Gelman and Markman’s (1986) 
triads could generally be distinguished by focusing on featural information: individual, albeit non-
obvious, features. In contrast, the novel stimuli used in Sloutksy et al. (2007) were relational and 
explicitly designed so that they could only be distinguished by comparing two features.  
Reasoning about relational category structures is likely to place greater demands on a child’s 
cognitive processing. It is well known that the number of relations that can be processed in parallel 
increases with age (e.g., Andrews & Halford, 2002; Halford, 1993), as does the ability to apply 
complex rules to a reasoning task (e.g., Zelazo, Frye & Rapus, 1996; Zelazo & Müller, 2002). Despite 
this knowledge, there is no study that has systematically and directly compared the influence of the 
category structure of items on inductive preference. Therefore, it is not yet valid to directly compare 
results from studies with different category structures.  
Children’s understanding of natural kind and artifact domains 
There is evidence that children as young as 3 years old are domain sensitive when making 
assumptions about the properties of an object (e.g., Backscheider, Shatz & Gelman, 1993; Carey, 
1985; Inagaki & Hatano, 1996; Jipson & Gelman, 2007; Mandler & McDonough, 1996). For example, 
Jipson and Gelman (2007) found that 3-5 year old children clearly distinguished between artifact and 
natural kinds when shown video clips of unfamiliar items and asked to generalize biological 
properties such as ‘does this one eat?’. In addition, children have been shown to successfully 
associate living traits such as breathing, survival and growth to natural kinds, and nonliving 
functional traits to artifacts (e.g., Gelman, 1988; Greif, Kemler Nelson, Keil & Gutierrez, 2006; Inagaki 
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& Hatano, 1996; Keil, 1992; Kemler Nelson, Egan & Holt, 2004). Thus children are clearly able to 
make category distinctions from a general understanding of the conceptual difference between 
artifacts and natural kinds (Booth & Waxman, 2002; Booth, Waxman & Huang, 2005). Children also 
make more subtle distinctions between natural kinds versus artifacts when generalizing properties 
or behavior. Specifically, when confronted with natural kinds, they focus on the item’s ‘insides’ (e.g., 
Gelman, 2003; Gottfried & Gelman, 2005); will be more likely to assign category membership based 
on internal properties (e.g., Gelman & Wellman, 1991), and appear to be sensitive to underlying 
causal mechanisms explaining behavior (e.g., Springer & Keil, 1991).  
There is an ongoing debate as to whether this sensitivity to domain difference reflects a 
cognitive bias to assume that animal and artifact concepts are fundamentally different in nature 
(e.g., Brandone & Gelman, 2009; Gelman, 2003; Goswami, 2001; Keil, 1989; Rattermann & Gentner, 
1998; Wellman & Gelman, 1998; see Medin, Lynch & Solomon, 2000 for an overview). According to 
Gelman (2003), children instinctively recognize that natural kinds are rich in ‘essence’ below the 
surface, whereas artifacts are “unlikely to have a rich cluster of nonobvious properties that are 
intrinsic to the objects being classified” (Gelman, 2003, p. 49). If these different assumptions reflect 
a fundamental, early-learned distinction between natural kinds and artifacts, this should also be 
reflected in different induction preferences. Specifically, if ‘insides’ are assumed to be more 
important for natural kinds, and children as young as 3 years old can distinguish between properties 
of natural kinds and artifacts (see Gelman, 2003), then a stronger bias to focus on nonobvious 
category information should be observed for this domain. Although many studies have examined 
developmental changes in the way children view natural kinds and artifacts, there are few studies 
that include both types of stimuli in induction tasks, and the focus of the research was not to directly 
compare the two domains (for example, Graham, Welder, Merrifield & Berman, (2010); Noles & 
Gelman, 2012). Finally, none of these studies have looked at whether the developmental trajectory 
of inductive reasoning for natural kinds and artifacts is the same.  
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The current study 
 We aimed to systematically compare the developmental effects of children’s inductive 
reasoning for items that vary in terms of their domain (natural versus artifact) and category 
structure (featural versus relational). It is difficult to manipulate category structure and domain 
within existing items since the factors determining category membership vary between domains. For 
example, within natural kinds, the relationships between category members (e.g., parent / child) or 
subtle differences in the configuration of parts (e.g., consider alligator vs. crocodile; jaguar vs. 
leopard) are often critical. In contrast, artifacts are more likely to be distinguished by one or more 
isolated features (e.g., a knife must have a blade; Levin, Takarae, Miner & Keil, 2001). Novel stimuli 
allow us full control over category membership information and perceptual similarity, and enables 
us to manipulate category structure (featural vs. relational) and domain (natural kind vs. artifact) 
orthogonally. We created two sets of novel natural kind and artifact stimuli. Category membership in 
one set could only be determined by a featural rule. Category membership in the other set could 
only be determined by a relational rule. Bearing in mind the concerns raised by Gelman and 
Waxman (2007), we created our artificial stimuli in line with those designed by Badger and Shapiro 
(2012). Their novel items restricted the level of children’s prior knowledge, but the stimuli had more 
accessible and realistic membership features and the category rules were more “biologically 
grounded” (Gelman & Davidson, 2013, p. 330). We used plausible featural and relational rules and 
pre-tested our stimuli with children to ensure that they viewed them as believable examples of 
natural kinds and artifacts. 
Our four-fold paradigm (1) category learning, 2) initial categorization, 3) category induction, 
4) final categorization) followed that developed by Sloutsky et al. (2007). However, unlike Sloutsky et 
al. we used a developmental manipulation to create items that were dissimilar in appearance, yet 
from the same category (as in Badger & Shapiro, 2012). The stability of category membership over 
development was demonstrated and reinforced through an animation in which a juvenile insect 
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transformed into an adult insect or an incomplete vehicle transformed into a complete vehicle. This 
animation was used to demonstrate two different categories of insect (rocky bugs vs. desert bugs) or 
vehicle (town trudges vs. country trudges).  
Although young children view many properties of natural kinds as stable across 
development (e.g., a person’s language), there are certain properties that young children view as 
unstable across development (e.g., race; Kinzler & Dautel, 2012). Therefore, it is possible that an 
apparent perceptual choice may actually reflect a decision to match on “age-category”.  However, 
this is unlikely to occur in our study since Badger and Shapiro (2012) showed – using the same 
paradigm and properties with similar stimuli – that children as young as 3 years old did not base 
their induction choices on the age of the items. Specifically, young children were no more likely to 
select the category choice when this was a dissimilar looking adult (same age as the target) than 
when this was a dissimilar looking juvenile (different age to the target). Instead, they consistently 
either made choices based on appearance information, or category membership regardless of 
stimuli ‘age’. This confirmed that children were able to see beyond the age of the stimuli when 
considering its properties.  Finally, in order to examine the developmental effects of inductive 
reasoning for domain and category structure, we tested children aged 4 to 9 years old.  
 Method 
Participants  
Four hundred and three primary school children participated: 105 Reception (4-5 years, 
mean = 5.04, range = 4.10-5.09 years), 109 Year 1 (5-6 years, mean = 6.04, range = 5.10-6.11 years); 
102 Year 2 (6-7 years, mean = 7.04, range = 6.10-7.09 years); 41 Year 3 (7-8 years, mean = 7.08, 
range = 7.02-8.01 years), and 46 Year 4 (8-9 years, mean = 8.07, range = 8.02-9.01 years); 214 males 
and 189 females. Each child was randomly assigned to either the featural or relational condition, and 
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completed both a natural kind task and an artifact task. All tests were counterbalanced to avoid 
order effects between the natural kind and artifact tasks.  
An additional 30 children participated in a stimulus similarity pre-test (10 Reception, 10 Year 
1 and 10 Year 2; range = 4.02-7.01; 15 males and 15 females), and a further 32 children participated 
in a domain identification and stimulus naming pre-test (12 Reception, 10 Year 1 and 10 Year 2; 
range 4.02-7.00; 16 males and 16 females).  
Stimuli 
 There were two domains of stimuli: natural kinds and artifacts. The natural kinds were newly 
designed novel insects (rocky bug vs. desert bug) and the artifacts were newly designed novel 
vehicles (town trudge vs. country trudge). Stimuli were either featural or relational in their category 
membership. From these, four novel groups were created: natural featural, natural relational, 
artifact featural and artifact relational. In the natural featural condition the two categories of insects 
differed on head shape. In the natural relational condition the two categories of insects differed on 
the relationship between the size of mandible versus sting. In the artifact featural condition the two 
categories of vehicles differed on wheel type. In the artifact relational condition the two categories 
of vehicle differed on the relationship between the size of the front loader versus the backhoe.  
Figures 1a and 1b show the smallest and largest sizes of each feature in the relational 
condition. However, there were 3 possible sizes (small, medium and large) so that focusing on one 
feature would not have allowed accurate categorization; the relative size of the two features was 
critical (e.g., medium front loader & small backhoe = country trudge; medium front loader & large 
backhoe = town trudge; rules explained in procedure, below). 
[Figures 1a and 1b here] 
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Simple animations were used to demonstrate a transition from juvenile to adult bug for the 
natural kinds (see Figure 2a) and from incomplete to complete trudge for the artifact kinds (Figure 
2b). Each stimulus differed from every other stimulus on at least one dimension (see Appendix A). 
[Figures 2a and 2b here] 
Similarity pre-tests were conducted to check that the target and distractor (perceptual 
choice) were significantly more similar in appearance than the target and category choice for every 
induction triad. Children saw 48 triads in total: 12 featural natural, 12 featural artifact, 12 relational 
natural and 12 relational artifact. For each triad, they were asked which of the two test items looked 
most like the target. We analyzed the total number of choices (out of 12) for each condition. One-
sample t-tests showed that for all conditions the perceptual distractor was chosen significantly more 
often than chance (see Table 1). Identification and naming pre-tests were conducted to check that 
the stimuli were considered to be biologically plausible. Children were shown four images from each 
category (two juvenile/ incomplete and two adult/ complete) one at a time, in random order. They 
were asked to state whether the item was a living (natural kind) or a non-living (artifact) thing, and 
what they believed it to be. Insects were labeled as living 95% of the time, with common responses 
being ‘bug’, ‘ant’ or ‘caterpillar’. Vehicles were labeled as non-living 87% of the time, with common 
responses being ‘digger’, ‘scales’, ‘shapes’ or ‘plates’. There was no significant difference in the 
percentage of correct classifications for insects versus vehicles: t (31) = 1.42; p = .165.  
[Table 1 here] 
Design 
Each child was randomly assigned to either the featural or relational condition and 
completed both a natural kind task and an artifact task. Category structure (featural vs. relational) 
and year group (Reception (4-5 years), Year 1 (5-6 years), 2 (6-7 years), 3 (7-8 years) and 4 (8-9 years) 
were between subjects and domain (natural vs. artifact) was within subjects. 
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Procedure  
Children completed the natural kind task and the artifact task in counterbalanced order, in 
two sessions. A four-fold procedure was followed for both conditions: category learning, initial 
categorization, category induction, and final categorization (as in Badger & Shapiro, 2012; Sloutsky 
et al., 2007). 
Category learning 
Children took part in two conditions (one natural and one artifact), but were only taught the 
rules of the condition they were about to take part in; they did not learn both natural and artifact 
rules at the same time. Rules for differentiating between the two categories in a given task were 
explained to the children whilst they watched an example of each category transform (see Figures 2a 
and 2b for examples). Children were told that each item comes in different colors and shapes, and 
we could only tell the difference based on the identified features (the rules). This ensured children 
understood that these extra dimensions (color and shape) were irrelevant.  
In the featural condition, children were taught that they could differentiate items based on a 
single feature: head shape of desert bug versus rocky bug (natural featural condition); wheel type of 
country trudge versus town trudge (artifact featural condition).  So children did not see these 
features as arbitrary, the function of this critical feature was explained in the following ways: “desert 
bugs live in the sand and have round heads for making soft burrows”; “rocky bugs live in rocks and 
have sharp pointy heads for digging”; “country trudges are used in fields and have tracked wheels for 
muddy surfaces”; “town trudges are used in towns and have round wheels to work on paved 
surfaces”.  
In the relational condition, children were taught that they could differentiate items based on 
the relationship between two features: size of sting versus size of mandibles for desert bug versus 
rocky bug (natural relational condition); size of front loader versus size of backhoe for country 
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trudge versus town trudge (artifact relational condition). The function of this critical feature 
combination was explained in the following way:  “desert bugs live in the sand and have larger 
mandibles to catch prey walking above on the sand, and a smaller sting to ‘knock-out’ prey”; “rocky 
bugs live in rocks and have smaller mandibles to hold onto prey in between rocks, and a larger sting 
to kill prey’; “country trudges are used in fields and have a larger front loader to move soil, and a 
smaller backhoe to move stones”, “town trudges are used in towns and have a smaller front loader 
to carry materials, and a larger backhoe to break concrete”.  
For all items, the experimenter pointed to the features on the screen as they gave these 
explanations, and it was not necessary for the child to know the terms used to label each feature. 
Nevertheless, terms were explained to the child if they asked (e.g., if a child asked what the 
mandibles were, it was explained that mandibles were the bug’s jaws/ mouthparts used to catch and 
eat food). 
Following the initial introduction to the two categories in one task condition, eight 
randomized categorization trials were shown and children had to identify the category at the 
beginning and at the end of each transformation. So for example, a child had to correctly identify an 
incomplete trudge, as well as the complete trudge at the end of the animation transformation, for 
that trial to be scored as correct. Corrective feedback was given, and the rule was reiterated, for 
example “Yes well done, it is a country trudge because it is used in fields and has tracked wheels for 
muddy surfaces” (incomplete trudge); “Yes well done, it is still a country trudge and it is still used in 
fields and has tracked wheels for muddy surfaces” (complete trudge). This was to remind children of 
the functional importance of the features and the stability of the category. 
Initial Categorization 
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Twelve further categorization trials were presented in random order, six of each category 
within the task condition. Children were not given feedback and the rule was not reiterated. This 
section tested whether the children could correctly identify the categories without help. 
Category Induction 
Twelve induction trials were presented in random order, with six targets from each category. 
Each trial began with a start to finish transformation (e.g., juvenile to adult) of the target category, 
followed by a triad of the target and two test items, one perceptual distractor and one category 
choice (see Figures 3a and 3b). Each target item was given a hidden property relating to its function 
or behavior, for example, ‘can be used at night’ or ‘sleeps during the day’ (based on types of hidden 
properties used in Badger & Shapiro, 2012; see Appendix B). The child was instructed to point to the 
test item which shared this property. If the child chose the perceptual distractor test item, this was 
coded as a perceptual choice; choosing the same-category test item was coded as a categorical 
choice. Due to ongoing debate as to the influence of labels on induction (see Noles & Gelman, 2012), 
no labels were used: items were referred to as ‘this one’. The task structure and hidden properties 
provided were the same for both the featural and relational conditions. The only difference between 
the two condition tasks was the rule differentiating the stimuli categories (either featural or 
relational rules). 
Final Categorization task 
This final phase followed the same procedure as the Initial Categorization task but with 
different stimuli, and was included to check whether children could still correctly identify the 
categories after the induction task. 
[Figures 3a and 3b here] 
Results 
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Categorization Performance  
In order to be sure that our analyses of induction choices only included children who were 
proficient at using the categorization rule, we used a very stringent cut-off based on their 
categorization performance. Specifically, children had to score 10/12 or above in both the initial and 
final categorization tasks to be included in any further analyses (scores of 10/12, 83%, are 
significantly above chance; binomial test proportion = 0.5, p = .04). Fifty-five children did not meet 
this criterion for the categorization tasks in either domain (43 Reception (4-5 years); 9 Year 1 (5-6 
years), and 3 Year 2 (6-7 years); 37 children did not meet criterion for one of the two domain tasks 
(17 Reception; 15 Year 1; 4 Year 2, and 1 Year 4). In order to be absolutely confident that the 
children included in our final analysis were fully competent at using the categorization rule, these 
children’s data were removed. This resulted in a final total of 311 children: 45 Reception: 42/63 
featural and 3/42 relational; 85 Year 1: 51/55 featural and 34/54 relational; 95 Year 2: 52/52 featural 
and 43/50 relational; 41 Year 3: 21/21 featural and 20/20 relational, and 45 Year 4: 25/25 featural 
and 20/21 relational. 
These children scored highly and above chance on the initial and final categorization tasks: 
Natural: Initial M = 97% (SD = 6.82), t (310) = 123.87; p < .001; Final M = 95% (SD = 7.99), t (310) = 
100.36; p < .001. Artifact: Initial M = 97% (SD = 7.26), t (310) = 113.16; p < .001; Final M = 97% (SD = 
7.18), t (310) = 115.59; p < .001. Featural: Initial M = 98% (SD = 3.94), t (381) = 238.93; p < .001; Final 
M = 98% (SD = 4.43), t (381) = 211.20; p < .001. Relational: Initial M = 96% (SD = 10.07), t (239) = 
70.41; p < .001; Final M = 94% (SD = 10.42), t (239) = 64.83; p < .001. However, since so few 
Reception children passed the strict inclusion rule, only Years 1-4 were considered in the analyses. 
Induction Performance  
A mixed GLM was conducted with children from Year 1-4 (5-9 years; 266 in total) to examine 
whether the percentage of category choices made in the induction task differed by year group, 
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domain and category structure. Although children completed the natural and artifact conditions in 
counterbalanced order, it is possible that they transferred a strategy from one domain to the other. 
We therefore included the order in which the tasks were completed as an additional factor (natural 
then artifact or artifact then natural). A significant effect of year group was found, F (3, 250) = 10.72; 
p < .001, ηp
2
 = .11, with the percentage of category choices increasing with year group (Year 1 (5-6 
years): M% = 39.30, SD = 42.45; Year 2 (6-7 years): M% = 50.48, SD = 44.29; Year 3 (7-8 years): M% = 
70.24, SD = 39.14; Year 4 (8-9 years): M% = 71.50, SD = 39.99). No significant effect of domain was 
found (natural vs. artifact), F (1, 250) = 2.55; p = .11, ηp
2
 = .01. A significant effect of category 
structure was found (featural vs. relational), F (1, 250) = 21.09; p < .001, ηp
2
 = .08, with children 
making fewer category choices in the relational condition (featural: M% = 64.56, SD = 41.40; 
relational: M% = 41.50, SD = 45.35). There was a non-significant effect of order, F (1, 250) = .25; p = 
.62, ηp
2
 = .001, showing that the counterbalancing of tasks adequately controlled for potential 
carryover effects. All interactions were non-significant.  
In order to examine age-related changes in children’s induction preference in more detail, 
we calculated the percentage of children showing each type of bias (perceptual or categorical) at 
each age / year group. Since the GLM indicated that the pattern varied by category structure but not 
domain, we calculated these percentages separately for the featural and relational conditions, 
collapsed across the two domains. Children making at least 10/12 category choices in the induction 
task were considered to have a category bias (% of category choices significantly above chance, 
binominal test proportion 0.5, p = .04); children making 2/12 or fewer category choices were 
considered to have a perceptual bias (% of category choices significantly below chance, binominal 
test proportion 0.5, p = .04). Children making between 3 and 9 category choices had no significant 
bias. Figure 4a shows that for the featural condition, we observed a gradual transition from only 38% 
of children showing a categorical bias in Year 1 through to the majority of children (84%) showing a 
categorical bias in Year 4. Figure 4b shows the same trend for the relational condition, however the 
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percentage of children showing a category bias is delayed by a year in the relational versus featural 
condition. 
[Figure 4a and 4b here] 
Discussion 
Previous research into inductive reasoning has produced contradictory results (e.g., Gelman 
& Markman, 1986; Sloutsky et al., 2007). We present the first systematic investigation of the 
developmental trajectory of category induction when both category structure and domain were 
explicitly manipulated. 
Our data yielded three main findings. Firstly, we found clear developmental effects with a 
preference for perceptual induction in the younger age groups, which transitions to a preference for 
category induction in the older age groups. Secondly, children’s inductive preference was affected by 
the category structure of the items. Although the developmental pattern was similar for both 
category structures, it took a further year for the majority of children to show a category bias in the 
relational condition, compared with the featural condition. Finally, we found no significant 
difference in inductive preference between the domains of natural kind and artifact.  
Developmental Differences 
We examined the development of category induction in children from age 4 to 9 years (UK 
school years Reception through to Year 4). In all conditions, we observed a gradual transition from a 
preference for perceptual induction in the youngest year groups through to a preference for 
category induction in the older year groups. Importantly, we only included data from children who 
passed our strict inclusion criteria in both initial and final categorization tasks. In the featural 
condition, the majority of children in all year groups met criterion on our categorization tasks. In the 
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relational condition, very few Reception children met criterion on our categorization tasks. We 
therefore didn’t include this year group in our inferential analyses.   
Our exclusion rate in the Reception year group for the relational condition was 93%. This 
was surprising given that the relational condition was adapted from Sloutsky et al. (2007), who had a 
much higher success and inclusion rate (exclusion rate of 20%). This difference may partly be 
explained by our more stringent inclusion criteria (10/12 – 83% – on both initial and final 
categorization tasks, rather than 6/8 – 75%), but there may also be more general differences in our 
samples (e.g., general attainment levels and socio-economic status). Interestingly, our Year 1 
children in the relational condition showed a very similar pattern of performance to the sample of 
Sloutsky et al. Even though these children were a year older than Sloutsky’s sample, the majority 
were biased towards perceptual induction, with only 25% of children showing a category induction 
bias. The pattern was similar in Year 2, and it wasn’t until Years 3 and 4 that the majority of children 
showed a bias towards category induction.  
These data are consistent with perceptual to categorical transition accounts of inductive 
reasoning (Badger & Shapiro, 2012) and analogical reasoning (Gentner, 1988; Gentner & 
Rattermann, 1991; Rattermann & Gentner, 1998). However, for the first time in the inductive 
reasoning literature, this study also considered the developmental effects when category structure 
and domain of the stimuli were manipulated systematically. These two novel findings are discussed 
below. 
Category structure 
This is the first study to show that the category structure of items used in inductive 
reasoning tasks (featural or relational) influences children’s preference for using perceptual or 
category induction. The progression from a perceptual to categorical preference was delayed a year 
for the relational category structure with the turning point at Year 3 (7-8 years old) rather than Year 
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2 (6-7 years old; as for the featural category structure).  This finding goes some way to uncovering 
why previous work has produced contradictory findings: studies using stimuli that can largely be 
categorized based on individual features (e.g., Gelman & Markman, 1986) have observed a category-
bias in children at a younger age than studies using categories that were defined by relational rules 
(e.g., Sloutsky et al., 2007). There are three possible explanations for the delay we observed for 
relational categories. Firstly, the categorization rule in the relational condition may have been too 
complicated for children to follow. More children failed to meet our categorization criteria in the 
relational condition suggesting that learning the categorization rule was harder. However, the 
children included in our analyses scored 10/12 or above in both the initial and final categorization 
tasks, showing their proficiency in remembering and applying the relational categorization rules over 
the entire testing session. Secondly, it could be argued that children struggled more with the 
relational category structures because these types of rules are less realistic than featural rules. 
However, several researchers have argued that in the real world, categories are more often defined 
in terms of relational rather than featural structures (e.g., Kittur et al., 2004; Saiki & Hummell, 1998; 
see also Barsalou, 1993). Thus, it is unlikely that our relational categories were intrinsically less 
realistic. Finally, it is possible that another developmental change occurring at this time is influential 
when making induction decisions. Specifically, this effect is consistent with theories of cognitive 
control and level of task demand (Andrews & Halford, 2002; Halford, Wilson & Phillips, 1998; Zelazo 
& Frye, 1998; Zelazo & Müller, 2002). For example, according to Andrews and Halford (2002), the 
“Relational Complexity” of a task is defined as the number of relations that must be considered 
jointly, and the ability to process more complex relations increases with age. It is not possible to 
make a direct comparison between our task and the age estimates provided by Andrews and 
Halford, since our tasks are so different. Nevertheless, our relational condition is clearly more 
complex than our featural condition. In our relational condition, two features must be identified and 
compared in order to identify category, compared to identifying one feature in the featural 
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condition. This poses an additional processing step before making the decision as to which item 
shares hidden properties with the target, compared to our featural condition. Although younger 
children may have struggled more with the complex task due to their less developed executive 
function and inability to hold and process multiple forms of information, we can not be certain of 
the cause of the delay without further investigation. What we can say though, is that future 
induction studies need to carefully consider the category structure of their items before they can 
directly compare their findings against other studies.  
Domain 
We found no evidence of domain differences in inductive reasoning (counter to predictions 
derived from Goswami, 2001; Keil, 1989; Rattermann & Gentner, 1998; Wellman & Gelman, 1998). 
In particular, young children were no more likely to make decisions based on category knowledge for 
natural kind items. This is inconsistent with the notion that there is an early bias to assume that 
hidden properties are more diagnostic for natural kinds (e.g., Gelman, 2003). Children did not 
appear to instinctively recognize an ‘essence’ in the natural kinds as being more important for 
induction decisions. This suggests that domain differences observed in other tasks do not extend to 
induction. In our study, the key features determining category membership were equally nonobvious 
for natural kinds and artifacts, and equally associated with the function or behavior of an item. We 
consider three explanations for our null effect. Firstly, it is possible that children did not differentiate 
between domains of the stimuli as they did not recognize the natural kinds as biologically plausible 
and therefore treated all items in the same way. However, the domain identification and stimulus 
naming pre-tests revealed that children spontaneously assigned domain-appropriate names to the 
items almost all of the time, making this explanation unlikely. In fact, the pre-test was a very harsh 
test of the plausibility of our stimuli since children were only shown the images briefly, had never 
seen them before, and were given no background or context. In contrast, in the main experiment, 
children were given a domain-plausible description which provided some context about where you 
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might find the item and an insight into its function or behavior. Secondly, it is possible that causal 
assumptions are not elicited by novel stimuli, as children do not believe the items to be real natural 
kinds. However, our stimuli were no less realistic than pictures children are frequently exposed to in 
books and on TV, and children readily engage with such stories appropriately (e.g., Ganea, Ma & 
DeLoache, 2011). In fact, during the experiment, children often spontaneously commented on the 
stimuli as if they were pictures depicting real things (e.g., “I’ve seen a rocky bug in my garden” or “I 
know that’s a town trudge because they go down my road sometimes”). This suggests that the 
images were seen as plausible and real, making this second explanation unlikely. Finally, the 
developmental effects observed in both domains suggest that over time, children gain an 
understanding of the importance of category membership in both natural and artifact categories. 
This is the first investigation of this developmental trajectory in a study with well-matched stimuli. 
Perhaps our findings show that instead of placing more importance of category membership onto 
natural kinds, children learn to increasingly acknowledge the importance of category membership 
for induction decisions, in both natural kind and artifact domains. Thus, children show a similar 
development of inductive reasoning in both domains.  We cannot make firm conclusions based on a 
null effect, and our stimuli are ‘artificial’ to allow matching across the domains. However, these 
findings are consistent with a domain-general transition from a perceptual to a categorical bias in 
inductive reasoning.  
Conclusion 
Using a paradigm that enables careful separation of perceptual versus categorical responses, 
our results support theories of a gradual developmental transition from a perceptual to a categorical 
bias with age. This trajectory appears to be domain-general for natural and artifact kinds. This would 
suggest that as children begin to appreciate the importance of category membership through 
increased knowledge, they understand and apply this in induction tasks. Our first novel finding is the 
impact of category structure on children’s development of inductive reasoning. We found that the 
Category structure and induction    22 
 
development of a category induction bias is delayed by approximately a year for the more complex 
relational category structures. So, although children are already beginning to appreciate the 
importance of category membership in induction, their ability to apply this is impeded by more 
complex (relational) category membership structures. This is important when considering previous 
research methodologies. Whereas Gelman and Waxman (2007) argue that Sloutsky et al (2007) 
underestimated children’s category induction capabilities because their stimuli were novel and 
arbitrary, we argue that the category structure of the items presented is more crucial. Specifically, in 
previous research, a preference for perceptual induction was present when more complex relational 
category structures were used (as in Sloutsky et al., 2007), and a category induction preference was 
present when the categories could be distinguished based on individual features (as in Gelman & 
Markman, 1986). Importantly, we found that although children showed a category bias at a later age 
for relational structures, there was a gradual increase in category induction in both conditions, which 
is not consistent with an early bias for category induction (Gelman, 2003). For the first time, our 
results have shown that category structure of items should be taken into consideration when 
interpreting developmental differences in category induction. Our second novel finding is the similar 
developmental pattern of inductive reasoning for both novel natural kinds and artifact kinds. We 
found that although children could name the natural kinds as natural, and the artifact kinds as 
artifacts, they applied the same importance of category membership to both. This category bias 
increased with age and suggests that once children are able to acknowledge the importance of 
category membership, they do so equally for natural kinds and artifact kinds.  
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Appendix  
A: The dimensions on which each stimulus differed, for natural kinds and artifact kinds.  
NATURAL KINDS     
Head Color Body Eye color Mandible-sting 
relation 
Angled Green Round White Large mandible, 
small sting 
Round Yellow Triangle Black Large sting, small 
mandible 
 Purple    
 
ARTIFACT KINDS     
Wheels Color Cabin Rim color Front-back loader 
relation 
Tracked Green Round White Large front, small 
back 
Round Yellow Triangle Black Large back, small 
front 
 Purple    
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B: The nonobvious properties used in both conditions. 
NATURAL KINDS 
Has thick blood 
Eats flies 
Comes from America 
Has cold blood 
Has soft bones 
Moves slowly 
Sleeps during the day 
Has a good sized heart 
Likes to be warm 
Doesn’t eat in winter 
Lays eggs 
Has a diminutive stomach 
 
ARTIFACT KINDS 
Uses thick oil 
Made in America 
Has a small engine 
Has lots of buttons inside 
Moves slowly 
Can be used at night 
Needs warm oil 
Has a good sized engine 
Doesn’t work in winter 
Moves quickly 
Has a chair that moves 
Has to be kept inside at night 
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Table 1. Frequency with which children paired items designed to be higher in perceptual similarity in 
each condition. 
Category 
structure 
Domain Test item Chosen as most 
perceptually similar 
(%) 
One-sample t-tests 
Featural Natural kind Perceptual distractor 99% t (29) = -481.06; p < .001 
Featural Natural kind Category choice 1% t (29) = -629.08; p < .001 
Featural Artifact kind Perceptual distractor 91% t (29) = -83.51; p < .001 
Featural Artifact kind Category choice 9% t (29) = -104.45; p < .001 
Relational Natural kind Perceptual distractor 100% t (29) = -1141.00; p < .001 
Relational 
Relational 
Relational 
Natural kind 
Artifact kind 
Artifact kind 
Category choice 
Perceptual distractor 
Category choice 
0% 
96% 
4% 
- 
t (29) = -138.22; p < .001 
t (29) = -177.71; p < .001 
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Figure Captions 
Figure 1(a). Examples of each type of bug for the featural condition (left = rocky bugs, right = desert 
bugs) and relational condition (top = desert bugs, bottom = rocky bugs). 
Figure 1(b). Examples of each type of trudge for the featural condition (left = town trudges, right = 
country trudges) and relational condition (top = town trudges, bottom = country trudges). 
Figure 2(a). Example of a natural kind transformation used in the Categorization task (the child is 
asked to name the infant and then the adult). 
Figure 2(b). Example of an artifact transformation used in the Categorization task (the child is asked 
to name the incomplete object and then the complete object). 
Figure 3(a). Example of an artifact induction trial. The child is shown the target transform from 
incomplete to complete artifact. The complete target remains on-screen whilst the two test items 
appear, creating the induction triad (target, category choice, perceptual choice).  
Figure 3(b). Example of a natural kind induction trial. The child is shown the target transform from 
infant to adult. The complete target remains on-screen whilst the two test items appear, creating 
the induction triad (target, category choice, perceptual choice). 
Figure 4(a). The percentage of children in each year group (Year 1 – Year 4) showing each type of 
induction bias for the featural condition. 
Figure 4(b). The percentage of children in each year group (Year 1 – Year 4) showing each type of 
induction bias for the relational condition. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
